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FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural
Law chs. 35-38 (1992).
2 HHS News Release, Oct. 16, 1992.
3 42 U.S.C. § 403.
4 HHS News Release, Oct. 16, 1992.
5 E.g., Shumaker v. Comm’r, 648
F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1981)
(determining factor is taxpayer's
purpose or intent in holding
property).
6 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(3).
7 Shumaker v. Comm’r, n. 5 supra.
8 Id.




12 20 C.F.R. § 404.429 (1993).
13 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii)(A).
17 Id.
18 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii)(B).
19 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii)(B)(1).
20 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii)(B)(2).
21 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii)(B)(3).
22 20 C.F.R. § 404.429(b)(2)(ii)(B)(5).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor sought avoidance, to
the extent of the homestead exemption, of a secured lien
against the debtor’s homestead. The secured creditor argued
that under Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Dixon, 885 F.2d 327
(6th Cir. 1989), the exemption was not impaired by the lien
because the exemption applied, under Ohio law, only in
cases of attachment, execution, garnishment or sale. The
court held that Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991)
overruled Dixon and that the lien could be avoided to the
extent of the homestead exemption. In re Boswell, 148 B.R.
31 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
IRA. The debtor claimed an interest in an IRA as exempt
under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 12-1006. The trustee objected
to the exemption, arguing that the statute’s presumption that
an IRA was a spendthrift trust was unconstitutional and that
the basic exemption was also unconstitutional as impairing
contracts. The court held that the exemption was
unconstitutional to the extent the IRA would be excluded
from the bankruptcy estate as a presumptive spendthrift
trust. But the court held that the IRA exemption was
constitutional. In re Brilley, 148 B.R. 39 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1992).
    CHAPTER 12   
LOTTERY PROCEEDS. After the debtors’ Chapter 12
plan was confirmed, the debtors won $6 million in a state
lottery.  The debtors used the first year’s proceeds to pay the
entire amount required by the plan which provided for 10
percent payment of unsecured claims. The trustee and
creditors sought modification of the plan to increase the
length of the plan to five years and to increase the payments
to 100 percent of unsecured claims. The debtors argued that
the motions for modification were untimely because all
payments had been made and the plan was completed.  In
addition, the debtors argued that because the plan did not
provide for any additional payments from disposable
income, no increase in payments could be allowed. The
court held that the modification motions were timely
because the plan was not completed since one piece of
property remained to be sold.  The court also allowed the
increase in payments and plan length, holding that to allow
the debtors the windfall of the lottery winnings was
inequitable and that the winnings were disposable income
subject to bankruptcy administration. In re Cook, 148 B.R.
273 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992).
TRUSTEE FEES. The Chapter 12 debtors sought
reduction of the 10 percent standing trustee fee because the
plan required very little effort or time from the trustee over
the life of the plan. The court held that the trustee fee was
not reviewable nor reducible by the court. In re Schollett,
980 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1992).
    CHAPTER 13
PLAN . The debtors, husband and wife, filed a joint
bankruptcy case, but the cases were not consolidated. The
debtors’ plan provided for 100 percent payment of joint
creditors’ claims but only 9.6 percent payment of the
debtors’ individual creditors’ claims. The debtors claimed an
exemption in their residence which was owned as tenants by
the entirety. The trustee objected to the plan, arguing that
unsecured creditors would not receive as much as they
would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. The trustee argued that all
of the creditors should be treated the same, as if the cases
were consolidated.  The court held that because the cases
were not consolidated and because the debtors’ joint
creditors were to be paid in full, the homestead exemption
would be allowed as against the separate creditors of each
debtor and that the separate creditors would not need to be
paid in full. In re Chandler, 148 B.R. 13 (Bankr. E.D.
N.C. 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS FOR
TAXES . The corporate debtor had filed a Chapter 11
liquidating plan which provided for allocation of plan
payments first to employment trust fund taxes before
payments on interest and penalties. The debtor also sought
an injunction against the IRS from assessing the I.R.C. §
6672 penalty against the sole shareholder who was also the
president of the corporation. The debtor argued that the
allocation and injunction were authorized by U.S. v. Energy
Resources, Inc., 495 U.S. 545 (1990). The court held that the
allocation of plan payments was not allowed where the
allocation would cause a decrease in the amount collected
by the IRS and did not contribute to a successful
reorganization, since the debtor was to be liquidated. The
court also held that an injunction would not be granted
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where the debtor would not be benefited, since the debtor’s
tax liability would not be affected, and the issue involved
the tax liability of a third party. In re Laminating, Inc., 148
B.R. 259 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The IRS was held to have
violated the automatic stay for withholding part of the
debtor’s income tax refund to offset a prior tax liability. The
IRS filed a claim in the bankruptcy case but had not filed a
proof of claim. The court held that the filing of the claim
acted as a waiver of the IRS immunity from suit and that the
debtor could be awarded attorney’s fees. In re Taylor, 148
B.R. 361 (S.D. Ga. 1992).
CLAIMS. The debtors had failed to make required
payments to fund two defined benefit pension plans. The
IRS filed a claim in the bankruptcy case for excise taxes,
under I.R.C. § 4971, for the failure of the debtors to
contribute the amounts to the benefit plans in 1989. After
the claims bar date, the IRS submitted amended claims
including additional penalties for 1989 and taxes and
penalties for failure to make payments in 1990. The IRS
sought priority status for the claims, administrative priority
for the claims and allowance of the amended claims. The
court held that the Section 4971 taxes were penalties and not
excise taxes and were not entitled to priority as taxes or
administrative expenses.  The IRS amended claims were not
allowed as untimely and as not sufficiently related to the
original claims.  In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,
148 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992).
DISCHARGE. The debtors sought discharge of federal
income taxes for which returns were filed late but more than
two years before the bankruptcy filing. The evidence
showed several reasons for the debtors’ failure to pay the
taxes, including a lavish lifestyle, divorces, failed business
investments and a belief that some of the taxes were
discharged in a previous bankruptcy. The IRS argued that
the debtors’ lavish lifestyle and failure to attempt to save
money to pay the taxes was evidence of a willful attempt to
evade or defeat their taxes. The court held that the IRS failed
to prove a willful attempt to evade taxes. In re Sonnenberg,
148 B.R. 35 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
The debtors had failed to file and pay federal income
taxes for 1969 through 1983. Under I.R.C. § 6020(b), the
IRS had filed substitute returns for those years.  The debtors
filed for bankruptcy in 1990 and the IRS filed a claim for
those taxes. The debtors argued that the taxes were
dischargeable because the IRS substitute returns were
sufficient to trigger the discharge rule of Section 523 for
taxes for which a return was filed more than two years
before the bankruptcy filing.  The court held that the
legislative history of Section 523 demonstrated that the
substitute returns were not considered returns for the
purposes of Section 523. In re Chapin, 148 B.R. 304
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992).
After the IRS determined that truck drivers employed by
the debtor were employees for which the debtor was
required to withhold federal employment taxes, the IRS
assessed tax liability under I.R.C. § 3509 for failure to
withhold employment taxes. The IRS filed a claim for the
taxes in the debtor’s bankruptcy case and the debtor argued
that the taxes were dischargeable because the tax was not
required to be collected. The court held that because the
taxes were assessed in lieu of the taxes the debtor failed to
collect, the taxes were not dischargeable. In re Billingsley,
93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶  50,045 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1992).
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The IRS ruled that a
debtor’s passive activity losses do not pass to the bankruptcy
estate but remain with the debtor.  The IRS also ruled that if
the bankruptcy estate sells its interest in a passive activity,
the losses from that activity are not treated as losses from a
passive activity. If the estate abandons its interest in a
passive activity to the debtor, the debtor succeeds to the
passive activity losses incurred by the estate.  The IRS also
ruled that the transfer of the debtor’s interest in a partnership
did not end the partnership’s tax year as to the debtor and
should not be treated as a change in the debtor’s partnership
interest under I.R.C. § 706(c)(2)(a), with the result that the
debtor’s share of all items of partnership income and loss are
allocable to the bankruptcy estate. Ltr. Rul. 9304008,
October 27, 1992. Note: the IRS has now issued proposed
regulations which include passive activity losses in the list
of tax items which pass to the bankruptcy estate in Chapters
7 and 11 (see Vol. 3, Agric. L. Dig., p. 191).
PENALTIES. The IRS had assessed penalties against
the debtor corporation for failure to timely file and pay
employment withholding taxes. The corporation sought
abatement of the penalties, claiming that the physical and
emotional problems of the corporation’s president were
reasonable cause for its failure to pay the taxes.  The court
held that the penalties would not be abated because the
president’s problems did not affect the corporation’s ability
to file and pay the taxes. The court noted that the
corporation had no internal checks or procedures for
monitoring the payment of the taxes. In re Roberts Metal
Fab., Inc., 147 B.R. 965 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. The debtor had filed a no-
asset Chapter 7 case and had received a discharge. The IRS
did not file a claim in the case and did not object to the
discharge. However, the IRS attempted a post-discharge
levy of the debtor’s wages for collection of the I.R.C. § 6672
penalty as a responsible person in a corporation which failed
to pay employment withholding taxes prior to the petition.
The debtor argued that the penalty was improperly assessed
against the debtor and, in any case, was discharged in the
Chapter 7 case. The court held that the Section 6672 penalty
was a nondischargeable tax and that the issue of the
propriety of the penalty was more properly tried in a
nonbankruptcy court. In re Queen, 148 B.R. 256 (S.D. W.
Va. 1992).
TAX LIENS. The IRS had filed pre-petition tax liens
against the debtors’ property. The debtors claimed
exemptions for household and personal property and one
debtor’s interest in a retirement annuity which had
spendthrift restrictions. The debtors argued that the exempt
property was not subject to the lien; therefore, the lien was
secured only to the extent of other nonexempt property. The
court held that exempt property remains subject to a
perfected pre-petition tax lien that is not otherwise avoided.
The court also ruled that the debtor’s interest in the
retirement annuity was subject to the tax lien only to the
extent of the present value of the right to the income. In re
Lyons, 148 B.R. 88 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1992).
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CONTRACTS
INTEREST. The plaintiff sold farm land to the
defendant but because of various and complex problems the
sale was not closed for four years. During the interim, the
defendant had possession of the land and used it for growing
crops. The plaintiff sued, under an unjust enrichment theory,
for interest on the purchase price for the period in which the
defendant had possession of the land before the closing. The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to interest because
the defendant had the benefit of both the use of the land and
the purchase money until the sale was closed. Ward v. J &
M Farms, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
RESCISSION. The defendant purchased a dairy farm
from the plaintiff in 1985. The farm had suffered an
outbreak of salmonella in the cattle in 1982 but the plaintiff
did not inform the defendant of this fact during the sale
negotiations.  In 1988, the defendant also lost several cattle
from an outbreak of salmonella and defaulted on the
purchase contract.  In defense against a suit for specific
performance, the defendant alleged that the defendant’s
failure to disclose the 1982 salmonella outbreak was a
material misrepresentation justifying rescission of the
contract and damages for the loss of cattle and other costs.
The plaintiff argued that it had no duty to inform the
defendant of the salmonella outbreak and that failure to
disclose was not a misrepresentation.  The court held that a
seller is required to disclose conditions of the property
which are material to a decision to purchase and which are
known to the seller but difficult for a purchaser to discover.
Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green Farm, 492 N.W.2d
392 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
COOPERATIVES
DUTY TO MEMBERS. The plaintiffs were grape
growers who were members of the defendant nonprofit
marketing cooperative. The cooperative closed its Arkansas
processing plant and terminated the members’ interests in
the cooperative. The plaintiffs sued the cooperative’s
directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, violation of the securities and anti-trust laws,
misrepresentation and negligence. The defendants argued
that the court could not exert personal jurisdiction over the
defendants because they were protected by the equitable
fiduciary shield doctrine as officers of the cooperative. The
court denied summary judgment for the defendants on this
issue, holding that issues of fact remained as to whether the
defendants had sufficient contacts with the state to warrant
personal jurisdiction.  The court also held that the plaintiffs
alleged sufficient actions by the defendants which would
give rise to personal liability. The court held that the
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the
breach of contract issue because the cooperative’s bylaws
and the marketing agreements allowed for unilateral
termination of the members’ interests with sufficient notice.
Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Co-op. Ass’n, Inc., 807 F.
Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
CORPORATIONS
DISSOLUTION.  The debtor had formed an Iowa farm
corporation in the 1970’s to farm land in Iowa. In 1973, the
corporation sold its Iowa land and purchased land in Illinois
and registered to do business in Illinois as a farm
corporation. In 1977, the Iowa Secretary of State
involuntarily dissolved the corporation for failure to pay the
annual fee and file an annual report. The debtors did not
receive notice of the dissolution and continued to operate the
farm as a corporation. In 1981, the corporation sold some of
its land to an Illinois land trust and rented the land from the
trust. The proceeds of the sale were used to pay operating
expenses and debts. In 1982, the trustee seized the
corporation’s farm equipment and other assets to recover
damages and costs resulting from the corporation’s default
of the lease. The corporation transferred the land to the
trustee, sold all other remaining land, and ceased farming.
After the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
trustee sought recovery of the corporation’s assets, arguing
that the conveyances of the land were without effect because
the corporation was dissolved at the time of the
conveyances. The court applied Iowa law effective at the
time because the corporation was created by Iowa law and
Iowa corporation dissolution law did not contravene Illinois
law. The court held that after dissolution, a corporation has
authority to sell its assets for the purpose of winding up its
affairs. Although the initial transfer of the land to the land
trust was not for the purpose of winding up the corporation's
affairs and therefore was not within the corporation's
authority, the final transfers of land were made with the
intent to terminate the corporation’s business and were
authorized by Iowa law. In re Morriss, 147 B.R. 930
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS. Because of heavy rains
and floods, the plaintiffs were unable to timely plant their
1986 wheat crops. The plaintiffs eventually planted their
crops as late as March 1987 but were informed in late 1987
that they would receive no deficiency payments for the
plantings because the crops were planted too late. The
plaintiffs appealed adverse administrative decisions,
claiming that they had no notice of the time restrictions on
planting the 1987 crops, that the defendant was estopped
from denying the deficiency payments because the county
committee approved the late plantings, and the lower yields
were related to the flooding and not the late plantings. The
court held that the defendant had presented sufficient
evidence of timely notice to the plaintiffs to support the
administrative judgment for the defendant as to the notice
claim. The court also held that the defendant was not
estopped by the erroneous county committee decision
because the plaintiffs should have known that the late
plantings would result in lower payments. The court in
effect required producers to be as knowledgeable about CCC
regulations and procedures, including CCC handbooks, as
the CCC. The court also upheld the defendant’s
determinations that the late plantings would lower yields
based on the information available to the defendant.
Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 807 F. Supp. 688
(D. Kan. 1992).
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GUARANTEED LOANS. The plaintiff bank had made
several loans to the debtor for operating the debtor’s ranch.
The debtor relied significantly on income from leasing a
portion of the ranch to a third party. The plaintiff had agreed
to a restructuring of the debtor’s loan and applied to the
FmHA for a 90 percent guarantee of the loan.  The FmHA
issued a Conditional Commitment for Guarantee of the loan.
The loan guarantee was finally approved and the plaintiff
filed a claim for payment after the debtor defaulted on the
guaranteed loan shortly after the loan was made. The debtor
defaulted primarily because the lease was terminated, and
the lease was terminated prior to the final approval of the
guaranteed loan. The FmHA alleged that the plaintiff knew
about the termination of the lease during the period between
the Conditional Commitment and the final approval of the
guarantee. Under the guarantee contract, the contract was
void if the lender failed to inform the FmHA of adverse
changes in the borrower’s financial condition. The FmHA
declared the guarantee void and refused to pay the plaintiff
because the plaintiff failed to inform the FmHA about the
lease termination. The plaintiff sought summary judgment,
arguing that the FmHA had no evidence to prove that the
plaintiff knew about the lease termination before the
approval of the guaranteed loan. The court held that
summary judgment would not be granted because (1) the
veracity of the parties needed to be determined, (2) the
plaintiff may have had knowledge that the lease was in
danger of being terminated and this knowledge may be
considered sufficient to void the guarantee, and (3) an issue
remained as to whether the FmHA detrimentally relied on
the plaintiff’s knowledge since the FmHA also may have
had notice of the lease’s possible termination. The court also
held that because the guarantee agreement required actual
knowledge of the plaintiff of an adverse change in the
borrower’s financial condition, the contract could not be
voided if the plaintiff was found to have negligently
misrepresented the borrower’s financial condition. First
Interstate Bank of Billings, N.A. v. U.S., 27 Fed. Cl. 348
(1992).
PESTICIDES.  The plaintiff purchased property which
was owned by a wood treatment facility which used a
pentachlorophenol product.  When an employee of the
plaintiff became ill with pentachlorophenol poisoning, the
plaintiff sued the chemical manufacturer for negligence and
strict liability for failure to warn.  The manufacturer argued
that the state court action was prevented by preemption of
FIFRA.  Although noting a split of authority on the issue,
the court held that FIFRA's labeling requirements impliedly
preempt a state law negligence action for failure to warn. On
remand, the court reconsidered its holding under Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992), and held that
the holding was not affected by Cipollone.  Arkansas-
Platte & Gulf v. Van Waters & Rogers, 981 F.2d 1177
(10th Cir. 1993), on rem from, 113 S.Ct. 314 (1992),
rem’g, 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'g, 748 F.Supp.
1474 (D. Colo. 1990).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will
residuary bequest established two charitable lead trusts
which provided for 20 years of annuity payments equal to
8.5 percent of the initial fair market value of the trust assets.
The estate was subject to lengthy administration because of
litigation involving estate assets, and the estate petitioned
the probate court to allocate the expenses between the trusts
and other testamentary bequests. The probate court allocated
27.5 percent of the administrative costs to the residuary
corpus and the remainder to residuary estate income. The
court held that the allocation of the probate court was to be
used for determining the value of the assets constituting the
charitable trusts for purposes of the charitable deduction.
Est. of Warren v. Comm’r, 981 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1992).
The taxpayer established a 10-year charitable lead trust
which provided for an annuity payment which was to be
made to charitable organizations by the trustee in
consultation with the remainder holders, the grantor’s
children. The annuity payments were to be made first from
trust income and then from trust corpus. The IRS ruled that
the transfer of property to the trust was eligible for the
charitable deduction and that the property was not includible
in the grantor’s gross estate because the remainder holders’
role in selecting the charitable organization beneficiaries did
not amount to a power of appointment over trust corpus.
Ltr. Rul. 9304020, Nov. 2, 1992.
DEDUCTION FOR DISTRIBUTIONS . During the
administration of the decedent’s estate, the estate received
royalty  income from mineral interests owned by the
decedent.  Although the executor did not obtain prior
probate court approval, much of the royalty income was
distributed to the legatees of the mineral interests. The estate
did receive approval of the probate court of the entire estate
administration when the estate was closed but did not
receive specific court approval of the distributions until after
an audit by the IRS. The IRS argued that because prior
approval was not obtained for the distributions, the
distributions were not “properly paid” for purposes of the
deduction under I.R.C. § 661. The court held that under
Oklahoma law, the distributions would be considered
properly paid where a probate court issued approval after the
distributions were made; therefore, the estate could deduct
the distributions from income. Buckmaster v. U.S., 93-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,054 (10th Cir. 1993).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX. The
decedent had executed a will in 1941 naming the taxpayer
and the taxpayer’s family as beneficiaries. The decedent was
under legal guardianship from 1947 until death but in 1982,
the decedent revoked the will and named new legatees. In
1986, the decedent’s guardian sought court approval to
make discretionary gifts to the legatees but the taxpayer
objected, claiming an interest in the decedent’s estate as the
rightful legatee because the 1982 will was invalid. The
taxpayer and guardian entered into an agreement whereby
the taxpayer disclaimed any interest in the decedent’s estate
and the taxpayer received $750,000 in trust for the taxpayer
and the taxpayer’s family. The IRS ruled that the entire
$750,000 was a taxable gift because the taxpayer gave no
consideration for the transfer.  The IRS also ruled that when
any interest in the trust passed to a person 37 1/2 years or
more younger than the decedent, the transfer was subject to
GSTT and eligible for the $1 million GSTT exemption. The
IRS also ruled that the transfer to the trust was not income to
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the taxpayer or family nor was the transfer a gift from the
taxpayer to the members of the taxpayer’s family. Ltr. Rul.
9304015, Oct. 30, 1992.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS.  The taxpayer was a major shareholder
and officer in a corporation which produced alternative
fuels.  The taxpayer made loans to and guaranteed other
loans to the corporation in several attempts to solve the
corporation's recurring cash problems until the corporation
was finally liquidated in bankruptcy.  The loans and
guarantees far exceeded the taxpayer's hopes for investment
return or salary.  The taxpayer's loans became worthless and
the taxpayer was required to pay on the guaranteed loans.
The court held that the loans and guarantees were deductible
business bad debts because the dominant motive of the
taxpayer in making the loans and guarantees was to maintain
the business and to protect the taxpayer's employment.
Litwin v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,041 (10th
Cir. 1993), aff’g, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,229 (D.
Kan. 1991).
C CORPORATIONS
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer
corporation operated a beef slaughtering business and was
approached by a chemical corporation to extract and sell calf
fetus blood. The blood was a worthless byproduct to the
taxpayer and the taxpayer decided against the project
because of the expense in extracting the blood.  However, a
shareholder/ officer of the corporation decided to extract the
blood and sell it to the chemical company as a side business.
After several years, the officer was promoted and the
corporation decided to take over the blood extraction
business. The IRS argued that the income from the blood
extraction business was corporation income and not the
officer’s separate income.  The court held that the income
was not included in the corporation’s gross income because
(1) the corporation was informed about and rejected the
business opportunity, (2) the blood was a worthless
byproduct, and (3) the officer expended the officer’s own
time and money on the blood extraction business. McCabe
Packing Co v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,066
(C.D. Ill. 1992).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayers sued a utility company for negligence arising from
a gas explosion and damage to their house. The jury
awarded compensatory and punitive damages without
allocating the punitive damages between the property
damage and the personal injury awards.  Under pre-1989
law, the court held that because the underlying suit was a
personal injury tort case, the punitive damages were
excludible from income. Horton v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. No.
8 (1993).
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was denied investment
tax credit and business expense deductions relating to a
horse breeding and showing business because the business
was not operated with intent to make a profit. The court held
that the taxpayer did not operate the activity in a business-
like manner because the business did not have a separate
bank account, the business had no prospects of making a
profit after 10 years of losses, and the land involved had not
appreciated in value. Crail v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-
39.
HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION. The IRS has issued
guidance for claiming business deductions associated with a
home office, under Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701
(1993), see p. 22 supra. In order to deduct as a business
expense costs associated with a home office, a taxpayer
must use part of the home exclusively and regularly–(1) as
the principal place of business for the taxpayer’s trade or
business; (2) as a place to meet or deal with patients, clients
or customers in the normal course of the trade or business;
or (3) in connection with the trade or business, if the portion
of the home is a separate structure attached to the home.  In
determining the first criteria, the IRS will use two factors–
(1) the relative importance of the activities performed at
each business location, and (2) the amount of time spent at
each location. The IRS will look at the circumstances of the
particular business in determining the relative importance of
the types of activities involved in each type of business and
will not consider the necessary or essential nature of the
activities in the home office as controlling. The IRS stated
that the comparison of the amount of time spent at the
various locations becomes more important when the relative
importance of the activities does not clearly determine the
principal place of business. The IRS notice also contains
revised examples which should be substituted for the
examples in Pub. 587 until that publication can be revised.
Notice 93-12, I.R.B. 1993-8.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT. The taxpayers entered
into an agreement to provide a business with solar energy
equipment in return for the amount of energy savings. The
court ruled that the taxpayers were not entitled to investment
tax credit until the tax year in which the equipment was in a
condition to produce electricity. Von Kalinowski v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-26.
IRA . At age 50, the taxpayer received a lump-sum
distribution from a qualified retirement plan after
termination of employment. The taxpayer elected 10-year
averaging of the income from the distribution and the IRS
assessed the 10 percent early withdrawal penalty. The court
held that the assessed penalty was proper. Bullard v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-39.
The decedent owned an interest in an IRA which had six
equal beneficiaries, one of which was the taxpayer. At the
date of death, the decedent was 65, prior to the required
distribution date. The beneficiaries agreed to partition the
IRA into six equal separate IRA’s. The taxpayer had the
separate IRA transferred to another IRA account but in the
decedent’s name. The taxpayer elected to receive payments
over the period of the life expectancy of the oldest of the six
beneficiaries but the taxpayer also received accelerated
payments of $10,000 in two years. The IRS ruled that the
partition and transfer of the decedent's IRA was not a
taxable transfer and that the accelerated payments did not
make the taxpayer ineligible for the installments over the
life expectancy period of the oldest beneficiary.  The IRS
also ruled that the distributions from the IRA in the
decedent’s name were not subject to the 10 percent early
withdrawal penalty. Ltr. Rul. 9305025, Nov. 12, 1992.
PARTNERSHIPS
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BASIS ADJUSTMENT. A one-third partner withdrew
from the partnership and received cash payments over
several years in liquidation of the partnership interest.  The
total of the cash payments exceeded the partner’s basis in
the partnership interest.  The partnership continued and had
a Section 754 basis adjustment election in effect. The IRS
ruled that if the partner made a Treas. Reg. § 1. 736-1(b)(6)
election, the partnership may adjust its basis in partnership
assets in a taxable year to the extent the partner realizes gain
from the distributions in that taxable year. Rev. Rul. 93-13,
I.R.B. 1993-7, 12.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in January
1993, the weighted average is 8.07 percent with the
permissible range of 7.27 to 8.88 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 93-10, I.R.B. 1993-5, 13.
S CORPORATIONS
SHAREHOLDER’S BASIS. The taxpayer was a
shareholder in an S corporation which had losses in 1984
through 1986. In 1985 the corporation repaid a loan from the
shareholder. In 1987 and 1988, the corporation had net
income and the corporation made distributions to the
shareholder. The IRS ruled–(1) in 1984, the shareholder
should have reduced the basis of the stock to zero, reported a
loss only to the extent of basis, and carried over a suspended
loss in excess of basis; (2) in 1985, the repayment of the
debt did not affect the carryover of the suspended loss nor
affect the shareholder’s stock basis; (3) in 1985 and 1986,
the corporation's losses only increased the amount of
suspended loss deduction because the shareholder’s stock
basis was zero; (4) in 1987, the shareholder should have first
increased stock basis by the share of corporation income,
then reduced the basis to zero by the share of the
corporation’s deductions, including the suspended losses,
with the result that the distribution was reportable as capital
gain; and (5) in 1988, the shareholder’s share of corporate
income and deductions would be applied to increase and
decrease stock basis, with the result that if the stock basis
was not reduced to zero, the distribution would not be
taxable to the extent of the stock basis (but the stock basis
would be reduced to zero) and any amount of distribution in
excess of basis would be capital gain. Ltr. Rul. 9304004,
Oct. 13, 1992.
TRUSTS. The taxpayers established trusts for their
children. Some of the trusts were funded with funds loaned
to the trusts by the grantors. The court held that the
taxpayers were liable for the taxable income of the trusts
because the grantors could demand payment of the loans at
any time.  Other trusts were funded with leasehold interests
in real property owned by the grantors. The court held that
the grantors were liable for tax on the rent received by the
leaseholds because the transfers to the trusts were
anticipatory assignments of income. The court also held that
the grantors were liable for the income from the trusts
because the leasehold interests reverted to the grantors in
less than 10 years. McGinnis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-45.
MORTGAGES
FORECLOSURE. After the defendants defaulted on
their loans, the plaintiff sought foreclosure of the mortgages.
The defendants filed for bankruptcy and the plaintiff
obtained limited relief from the automatic stay to continue
the foreclosures.  However, the plaintiff dropped any claim
against the defendants personally and proceeded in rem
against the collateral only. The defendant dismissed their
bankruptcy case and redeemed two parcels of the land. The
plaintiff then sought to proceed against the defendants
personally for the deficiency from the foreclosure sales. The
court held that the in rem foreclosure proceeding barred any
proceeding against the defendant personally, under the
choice of remedies doctrine. The court held that the plaintiff
was not prevented by the bankruptcy case from proceeding
against the defendants but only recognized that the personal
liability was dischargeable in the bankruptcy case.  Thus, the
defendants did not realize any windfall or escape any
liability for which the defendants were not entitled had they
continued the bankruptcy case. Farm Credit Bank of
Omaha v. Faught, 492 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1992).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ROTARY CUTTER. The plaintiff was injured when a
part of a rotary cutter fell on the plaintiff while the plaintiff
was operating the cutter. The plaintiff sued the seller and
manufacturer under the Louisiana Products Liability Act,
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.51 et seq., for the manufacture of a
defective product. Although the plaintiff settled with the
manufacturer, the plaintiff also sought liability of the seller
as a manufacturer. The court held that under the statute, the
seller was not a manufacturer because the seller purchased
the cutter used and resold the cutter without making any
modifications or repairs. Lafleur v. Hardee
Manufacturing Co., Inc., 609 So.2d 1212 (La. Ct. App.
1992).
PROPERTY
TAX SALE. In 1917, the property in dispute was
transferred to the parent of the plaintiffs “and the heirs of his
body.” The court found that this transfer gave the parent a
life estate in the property and the plaintiff’s a contingent
remainder. In 1932, the property was sold at a tax sale to the
predecessor-in-interest of the defendant, a corporation solely
owned by the predecessor-in-interest (shareholder).  The
parent failed to redeem the property. In 1960, a portion of
the property was condemned for a highway, and the
plaintiffs and shareholder litigated who should receive the
condemnation proceeds. The court in that hearing
determined that the shareholder held a life estate and was
entitled to the interest on the proceeds until the death of the
parent. The court in this case held that at the death of the
parent, the title to the property passed to the plaintiffs
because the issue of title was determined in the
condemnation proceeding.  The court also held that the
defendant corporation was estopped from challenging the
title by the shareholder’s participation in the condemnation
proceeding because the corporation was little more than the
alter ego of the shareholder. Moore v. Swayne-Hunter






REPLEVIN. The plaintiff held a perfected purchase
money security interest in the defendant’s inventory of farm
equipment. When a competing security interest holder
attempted to replevin the equipment, the plaintiff sought
replevin of the equipment and provided a $300,000
nonsurety bond. The plaintiff argued that the bond was
sufficient because the plaintiff had adequate financial
resources to secure the nonsurety bond. The court held that
the plaintiff’s financial status was irrelevant and that the
amount and security of the bond itself had to be sufficient
to protect the debtor. Ford New Holland v. Thompson
Machine, Inc., 617 A.2d 540 (Me. 1992).
CITATION UPDATES
Bufferd v. Comm'r, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993), aff’g, 952
F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1991-170
(statute of limitations; S corporations), see p. 33 supra.
Irvine v. U.S., 981 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1992), rev’g on
rehearing, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,074 (8th Cir.
1991), rev'g, 1989-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,818 (D.
Minn. 1989) (disclaimers), see p. 12 supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, one volume looseleaf annotated
manual is an ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants,
lenders and other professionals who advise agricultural
clients.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including one update at no extra charge. Updates are
published every four months to keep the Manual current
with the latest developments. After the first update,you will
be billed with each additional update. The 1993 updates
cost $35 each.
For your copy write to Robert Achenbach, Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 5444, Madison, WI 53705.
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